FUTURISM AND AIR PAINTING PT.4
4) Hence the zeroing urgency of which Dada would perhaps be the maximum expression. Against the desperate attempts made by Cubism and Surrealism, to be able to finally gain a complete vision (by attempting a "definition" of the complexity of points of view - cubism - and the complexity of the psychic structure through which we would relate to reality, always made of consciousness and unconscious, in-one - surrealism), the Dadaist scream sounded irrevocable. It is therefore definitive. In other words, art was approaching that borderline that, alone, could still give it meaning: art was becoming the lucid and tragic (but at the same time exhilarating - like any 'extreme' experience) recognition of one's original existence.
This, the framework with respect to which Futurism would have wanted an absolutely unedited arrangement.
And therefore very surprising.
The futurist artist had in fact renounced to say "the thing" - only for this could he feel immune both from the dialectical failure suffered in relation to the illusion of totality (and therefore of the historical concrete), as from the disillusionment resulting in a relativistic subjectivism destined to to make art an irrevocably marginal and decorative activity.
The futurist artist was not interested in the world of things and beings at all. And not in favor of something else, perhaps more noble and perfect. Not even, however, he could want the simple zeroing of objects (in the manner of Malevich - which even by Futurism would have been decisively influenced).
The futurist artist had rather understood that all the object specificities from which the world seems to consist every time are nothing more than the determinations of a promise aimed decisively at the "future"; that is, he understood that everything is an announcement of what can still be.
And that, precisely for this reason, reality had to be blown up: and not so much to attest and make evident the impossibility of truly experiencing it, but rather to transfigure its apparent definitiveness. To deliver it, that is, to its real 'destiny' ... to reveal what, in it and for it, actually ended up announcing itself. Thus freeing the life of a matter which, in truth, was nothing of what we could have indicated as an intrinsic constituent of its determination.
But, first of all, it was necessary to question whether its determination meant what it really was; or rather, that it really was what it seemed to be, by virtue of its evident determination. It was necessary to question its being so and so distinct from another that it should have constituted precisely the 'context'. As if it were really a relationship between mutually defining certainties. And therefore in fact 'defined'. Resolved, that is, in what of them would actually be able to appear.
09.06.2021
This, the framework with respect to which Futurism would have wanted an absolutely unedited arrangement.
And therefore very surprising.
The futurist artist had in fact renounced to say "the thing" - only for this could he feel immune both from the dialectical failure suffered in relation to the illusion of totality (and therefore of the historical concrete), as from the disillusionment resulting in a relativistic subjectivism destined to to make art an irrevocably marginal and decorative activity.
The futurist artist was not interested in the world of things and beings at all. And not in favor of something else, perhaps more noble and perfect. Not even, however, he could want the simple zeroing of objects (in the manner of Malevich - which even by Futurism would have been decisively influenced).
The futurist artist had rather understood that all the object specificities from which the world seems to consist every time are nothing more than the determinations of a promise aimed decisively at the "future"; that is, he understood that everything is an announcement of what can still be.
And that, precisely for this reason, reality had to be blown up: and not so much to attest and make evident the impossibility of truly experiencing it, but rather to transfigure its apparent definitiveness. To deliver it, that is, to its real 'destiny' ... to reveal what, in it and for it, actually ended up announcing itself. Thus freeing the life of a matter which, in truth, was nothing of what we could have indicated as an intrinsic constituent of its determination.
But, first of all, it was necessary to question whether its determination meant what it really was; or rather, that it really was what it seemed to be, by virtue of its evident determination. It was necessary to question its being so and so distinct from another that it should have constituted precisely the 'context'. As if it were really a relationship between mutually defining certainties. And therefore in fact 'defined'. Resolved, that is, in what of them would actually be able to appear.
09.06.2021